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Abstract
This brief contribution to the debate concerning global law draws on the authors’ analysis of 
international criminal justice. It argues that the extent to which international criminal law 
is in fact contributing to global justice in the aftermath of international crimes remains to be 
seen. In particular, the smooth relationship between international criminal law and the 
perception of justice can be called into question, as it relies too heavily on the idea that 
going through the motions of westernized forms of international criminal law will 
automatically inculcate a sense of justice in victimized populations, while en passant 
contributing to the resurrection of the rule of law. The connection to broader issues in global 
justice and global law will draw heavily on Amartya Sen’s recent critique of John Rawls’ 
Theory of Justice, in which the former employs the ancient Sanskrit notions of niti and 
nyaya.
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1. Introduction
One of the primary difficulties in discussing the development or emergence 
of global law is that the construct is used loosely and can mean different 
things in the eyes of different scholars.1 In this short contribution we will 
sidestep this problem by positing that a clearer understanding of global law 
1 T Nardin, ‘Justice in the Global Order’ (2011) 37 Review of International Studies 259.
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can be found in the application of this broad idea to relevant areas of law, 
in which progression – at least rhetorically – towards a global legal order is 
underway and where the notion of contributing to global justice is explicit.
This applies in particular to our own area of expertise; that of criminal 
law. The developments in the past decades in the field of international 
criminal law have been, in many ways, spectacular. There is the definition 
of a special class of international crimes; genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity; the installment of ad hoc tribunals - first for Rwanda and 
the former Yugoslavia (the ICTR and ICTY), followed by judicial bodies for 
Sierra Leone, East Timor, Lebanon and Cambodia, ultimately culminating 
in the establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court.2 The 
connection of international criminal law to global justice is evident in the 
stated key aim of holding the ‘hostis sui generis’, the enemies of all mankind, 
to account for their atrocities. It is also made explicit in the view of the 
current prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno Ocampo, that the ICC seeks 
global justice.3 The latter sentiment is echoed in the work of scholars of 
globalization who view the materialization of international criminal law as 
key elements of the development towards global justice.4
However, the extent to which international criminal law is, in fact, con-
tributing to global justice in the aftermath of international crimes remains 
to be seen. In our recent work we questioned the smooth connection 
between international criminal law and the perception of justice, which 
relies too heavily on the idea that going through the motions of westernized 
forms of international criminal law will automatically inculcate a sense 
of justice in victimized populations, while en passant contributing to the 
resurrection of the rule of law.5
2 B Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court. Between 
Sovereignity and the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press 2003).
3 L Moreno-Ocampo, ‘The International Criminal Court: Seeking Global Justice’ (2007) 
40 Western Reserve Journal of International Law 215.
Of course it is possible to take issue with the notion that the ICC indeed has global reach, 
as neither the United States, nor the majority of Islamic and Asian countries have ratified 
the Rome Statute.
4 D Held, ‘Cosmopolitanism: globalisation tamed?’ (2003) 29 Review of International 
Studies 465.
5 RM Letschert, RH Haveman, A de Brouwer and A Pemberton (eds), Victimological 
Approaches to International Crimes: Africa (Intersentia 2011); A Pemberton, RM Letschert, 
A-M De Brouwer and RH Haveman, Het internationale strafrecht: een victimologisch per-
spectief ’ [2011] Tijdschrift voor Criminologie 385; A Pemberton, RM Letschert, A-M De 
Brouwer and RH Haveman, Coherence in International Criminal Justice: A Victimological 
Perspective (forthcoming). See also: MA Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2007); LE Fletcher and HM Weinstein, ‘Violence and Social 
Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation’, (2002) 24 Human Rights 
Quarterly 573.
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In this brief contribution to the debate concerning global law we will 
sketch these problems in greater detail, before connecting this to more 
abstract notions of justice. The latter will draw heavily on Amartya Sen’s 
recent critique of John Rawls’ Theory of Justice, in which he employs 
the ancient Sanskrit notions of niti and nyaya.6 Finally, in conclusion, the 
analysis of international criminal law will be used as a base to provide more 
general notions about global justice and global law.
2. The (Mis)match between International Criminal Law and Global 
Justice?
As a means of ensuring justice, criminal law is by no means perfect. Its 
faults are legion, from a poor coverage rate, through bias in its administra-
tion to a large discrepancy between its stated aims of retribution and pre-
vention and its actual outcomes.7 It is no small wonder that politicians who 
tout the adjudication and enforcement of criminal law as a resolution to 
social problems are viewed by the academic community with suspicion: 
well captured in the concept of penal populism.8
In the move to the international level the shortcomings of criminal law 
have been given short shrift, replaced instead by a triumphant and aspira-
tional rhetoric of ‘ending impunity’ and ‘delivering safety and justice on a 
global scale’.9 This is remarkable, considering the fact that the characteris-
tics of international crimes render the delivery of justice through criminal 
law, more rather than less difficult. Just to mention a number of additional 
difficulties: establishing individual guilt for crimes committed as a collec-
tive and/ or in the name of a collective,10 in other words the abundance 
of evidence of collective evil, coupled with a lack of proof of individual 
6 A Sen, The Idea of Justice (Allen Lane 2009); J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard 
University Press 1972).
7 JJM van Dijk, World of Crime, (Sage 2007); L Wacquant, Punishing the Poor: The 
Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity (Duke University Press 2009); M Tonry, 
Retributivism has a Past: Has it a Future? (Oxford University Press 2012).
8 JV Roberts, L Stalans, D Indermaur and M Hough, Penal Populism and Public Opinion: 
Lessons from Five Countries (Oxford University Press 2003).
9 MA Drumbl, ‘Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass 
Atrocity’ (2005) 99 Northwestern University Law Review 539 & MA Drumbl, Atrocity, 
Punishment and International Law (Cambridge University Press 2007).
10 See Drumbl, ‘Collective Violence’ ibid; DJ Levinson, ‘Collective Sanctions’ (2003) 56 
Stanford Law Review 345 & M Osiel, ‘The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against 
Mass Atrocity’ (2005) 105 Columbia Law Review 1751.
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wrongdoing; the uncertain line between culpable and inculpable parties,11 
including the role of so-called innocent bystanders,12 the difficulty of 
finding a remedy suitable to the enormity of the crimes committed13  
and, coupled with the previous points, the diminished likelihood of reach-
ing goals of criminal justice such as retribution and general or special 
prevention.14
In practice moreover, these shortcomings have been exacerbated by 
problems of selectivity, insufficient proportionality and lengthy proce-
dures. The punishment meted out for international crimes is lower rather 
than higher compared to ordinary crimes, while the treatment of the often 
top-level suspects and convicts in international criminal justice is vastly 
superior to the facilities available in most domestic criminal justice sys-
tems.15 The latter also applies to the emphatic and time consuming empha-
sis on meeting all criminal-procedural nicities. In stark contrast to the 
trials of Nuremberg, which were over and done with within the space of 
11 months and trials in the domestic sphere – the Rwandans managed to try 
over 5000 cases with one tenth of the funding of the ICTR, before the latter 
handed down one verdict – international criminal law proceeds at an 
almost glacial pace.16
The reason given for this, as noted by ICTY-appeals court judge Patricia 
Wald, is that ‘we have to assure that justice is seen to be done’.17 This is also 
11 Osiel, ibid.
12 Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (n 5); LE Fletcher, ‘From indiffer-
ence to engagement. Bystanders and International Criminal Justice’ (2005) 26 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 1013 & E Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and 
Other Group Violence (Cambridge University Press 1989).
13 Osiel (n 10) & RM Letschert, T Van Boven, ‘Providing Reparation in Situations of Mass 
Victimization: Key Challenges Involved’ in Letschert (n 5).
14 MA Drumbl, ‘Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of 
Mass Atrocity’ (2005) 99 Northwestern University Law Review 539; DJ Levinson, ‘Collective 
sanctions’ (2003) 56 Stanford Law Review 345; M Osiel, ‘The Banality of Good: Aligning 
Incentives Against Mass Atrocity’ (2005) 105 Columbia Law Review 1751; MA Drumbl, 
Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (Cambridge University Press 2007); LE Fletcher, 
‘From Indifference to Engagement. Bystanders and International Criminal Justice’ (2005) 26 
Michigan Journal of International Law 1013; E Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide 
and Other Group Violence (Cambridge University Press 1989); MJ Aukerman, ‘Extraordinary 
Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice’ (2002) 15 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal 39.
15 MA Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (Cambridge University Press 
2007).
16 GJ Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crime Tribunals (Princeton 
University Press 2001); J Rabkin, ‘Global Criminal Justice: An Idea Whose Time has Passed’ 
(2005) 38 Cornell International Law Journal 753.
17 Rabkin (2005) uses this quote to make a similar point.
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the explanation for international criminal law’s recurring emphasis on the 
independence of international criminal law, which attempts to protect it 
from so-called victor’s justice, but, simultaneously, erects a Chinese wall 
separating it from domestic attempts to provide justice, from other, concur-
rent attempts to rebuild state structures and from the history, tradition and 
political realities of affected societies.18
International criminal law is remote justice, meted out by an ‘interna-
tional community’ which may have positive connotations for many com-
mentators, but whose actions in the experience of inhabitants of war-torn 
societies are most often characterized succinctly as ‘too little, too late’.19 
The legitimacy of the process and actors involved in the process of interna-
tional criminal law in the eyes of these populations is suspect, which fur-
ther strains the smooth and easy connection of international criminal law 
to the provision of a sense of (global) justice.20
3. Niti and Nyaya: Applying Ancient Sanskrit Notions to International 
Criminal Law
In our view much of the difficulties in the development of international 
criminal law can be traced to the over-emphasis on procedure and more 
precisely the faith that striving for global justice encompasses the develop-
ment of a perfect procedure, which is capable of ensuring just outcomes, 
irrespective of the context in which it is placed.21 This procedural view of 
justice has a decidedly Rawlsian quality. The requirement of the so-called 
veil of ignorance in Rawls’ original position as a starting point for delibera-
tions about justice necessitates a view of justice which is independent 
18 LE Fletcher and HM Weinstein, ‘Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the 
Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation’ (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 573; HM 
Weinstein, ‘Editorial: The Myth of Closure: The Illusion of Reconciliation. Final Thoughts on 
Five Years as Co-Editor in Chief ’ (2011) 5 International Journal of Transitional Justice 1.
19 Eg MJ Aukerman, ‘Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding 
Transitional Justice’ (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 39.
20 See for instance T Longman, P Pham and HM Weinstein, ‘Connecting Justice to 
Human Experience: Attitudes Toward Accountability and Reconciliation in Rwanda’ in E 
Stover and HM Weinstein (eds), My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the 
Aftermath of Mass Atrocity (Cambridge University Press 2004). See also the subsequent pop-
ulation surveys of the Berkeley Human Rights Center.
21 In greater detail: A Pemberton, RM Letschert, A-M De Brouwer and RH Haveman, Het 
internationale strafrecht: een victimologisch perspectief ’ [2011] Tijdschrift voor Criminologie 
385; A Pemberton, RM Letschert, A-M De Brouwer and RH Haveman, Coherence in 
International Criminal Justice: A Victimological Perspective (forthcoming).
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of specific situations: the participants in the deliberation do not know what 
their position is in society or indeed to which society they belong. The jus-
tice of a procedure is then judged by its fairness as a procedure, rather than 
the outcomes it delivers in specific situations.
Recently, Amartya Sen developed a critique of Rawls’ theory which is 
probably most succinctly summarized in his description of the Sanskrit 
justice concepts niti and nyaya.22 The former concept proposes that justice 
should be conceptualized in terms of organizational arrangements, regula-
tions and procedures; it is in other words an arrangement-focused view of 
justice, which fits well with Rawls’ theory. The latter instead concerns the 
world that actually emerges; it is a realization-focused understanding. Niti 
measures justice by the extent to which it meets some standard of perfec-
tion, while nyaya does so on the basis of a comparison with other realistic 
alternatives, a comparison that includes the independent value of organi-
zational arrangements, but does not allow this to override all other 
concerns.
Seeing the poor fit between the reality of international crimes and prin-
ciples of criminal justice, we have argued previously that nyaya, rather than 
niti is a base to assess international criminal law.23 Using niti as a bench-
mark entails striving for a standard of perfection within the justice proce-
dure, blinded to the reality that in situations of mass victimisation it is a 
wholly unattainable ideal. A focus on niti restricts justice in the aftermath 
of mass victimization in three ways: it reduces it to what the criminal jus-
tice procedure can provide, isolates criminal justice from other relief efforts 
and – importantly - ringfences resources that may stand a better chance of 
providing a measure of justice if allocated elsewhere.
The extent to which justice is done should be measured by the actual, 
although probably at best modest, contribution to rebuilding society rather 
than its adherence to the blueprint of (Western) criminal justice procedure. 
Maybe more so than in the domestic sphere justice after international 
crimes is done, when it is seen to be done.24 Historical and cultural aspects 
may give rise to different solutions, while the interplay between the crimes 
committed and the views of victimized populations may differentiate the 
22 A Sen, The Idea ofJjustice (Allen Lane 2009).
23 A Pemberton, RM Letschert, A-M De Brouwer and RH Haveman, Het internationale 
strafrecht: een victimologisch perspectief ’ [2011] Tijdschrift voor Criminologie 385.
24 MA Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (Cambridge University Press 
2007); J Feinberg, ‘The Expressive Function of Punishment’ in J Feinberg (ed), Doing and 
Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton University Press 1970).
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reactions from one instance of victimization to another, even within the 
same societies: as Fletcher and Weinstein note, an ecological view of justice 
may be most appropriate.25
A key element of the use of nyaya rather than niti as lense for viewing 
international criminal law is therefore the insight that delivering global 
justice after international crimes is unlikely to proceed through a one-size-
fits-all solution. We should never lose sight of the fact that lawmaking 
never entails a simple translation of morals: we have to reckon with the 
spin that the social and political reality will place upon this connection.26 
The question to what extent international criminal law delivers justice 
needs an empirical answer: this can not be resolved on the basis of theory 
and assumptions alone.
The yardstick involved in this measurement should include procedural 
concerns, but not allow them to overrule other, often more substantive 
measures of justice. Of course this is a highly complicated matter – the 
space of this article does not allow us even to attempt to broach the myriad 
complexities of developing such a measurement tool, in the face of the dif-
ferent and often competing notions of justice involved – but work of this 
kind is possible and in fact conducted even in the most difficult of circum-
stances (again we point to the work of Berkeley Human Rights Center as a 
promising practice example).27
4. Conclusion: Nyaya and Global Justice
Our analysis of the experience, particularly in the last 20 years, with inter-
national criminal law, has led us to the insight that nyaya rather than niti 
provides an appropriate base for assessing justice in the aftermath of inter-
national crimes. If generalization from this field of law to others is valid, the 
following general observations can be made.
First, legal scholars and policy makers should resist the temptation to 
view the terra incognita of global law as a licence to abstract its develop-
ment and construction from the messy and uncomfortable realities con-
nected to its application in practice. The vacuum of global law is not a blank 
slate: it is pre-shaped by the constraints of culture, politics and economics 
25 LE Fletcher and HM Weinstein, ‘Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the 
Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation’, (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 573.
26 D Runciman, Political Hypocrisy: The Mask of Power from Hobbes to Orwell and Beyond 
(Princeton University Press 2008).
27 M Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to do (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2009).
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and post-shaped by the interactions between law and legal actors, in the 
patterns visible in the growing body of work in the field of empirical legal 
studies. Indeed, as a rule the contribution of a system of global law to global 
justice is to a matter of empiricism, rather than of assumption.
And finally, global justice will likely entail global laws rather than global 
law: the political, social and cultural specificities of a given situation neces-
sitate different solutions, also in the legal sphere. Rather than one-size-fits-
all, the extent to which the global legal order will contribute to global 
justice, depends on the extent to which it meets these demands of ecologi-
cal appriopriateness.
